

NATO ISAF SECRET



TF81                    OP RAHBARI  
LEVEL 2                DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)  
                          7 DAY APPROVAL

OP TYPE:

DDO

START OF MISSION:

21 AUG 10 (On trigger)

END OF MISSION:

22 AUG 10

TGT:

B1:                OBJ BURNHAM (RTAF 2307)

(ABDUL KALTA)

B2:                OBJ NOVA / PSR(S)1 (RTAF 2306)  
(NEMATULLAH)

JPEL:

YES

JPEL LIMITATIONS:

NIL

TAO:

TALAWE BERFAK DISTRICT  
BAGHLAN PROVINCE

42S VD 23036 91463

CRU Commander  
PSR(S1, PSR(S2, PS)

MOI PROSECUTOR/COMD

PSR(IC)4

PSR(IC)4  
(Approved 16 Aug) RC Commander

GiROA APPROVAL:

RC CONCURRENCE:  
Conditions: LO to TOC, Soft Knock, KLE engagement

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OBJ BURNHAM  
7 DAY APPROVAL

LEVEL 2

TTF81 OP RAHBARI  
DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED



**JUSTIFICATION FOR NIGHT RAID:** It is most appropriate to conduct this operation in the hours of darkness:

- 1. IN ORDER TO MINIMISE THE POTENTIAL FOR CIVCAS**  
PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3  
  
Assessment that night raid lessens risk to civilians because civilians likely indoors/less risk of combat

## 2. IN ORDER TO MINIMISE THE THREAT

**Assessment that night raid conditions lessen risk of large-scale insurgent response**

3. IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY DETAIN ABDUL KALTA (OBJ BURNHAM).  
**PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

**Assessment** that night raid conditions unlikely to favour successful detention

## 4. MITIGATION – BATTLESPACE HANDOVER PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Assessment of positive security impact in area of operation; contingency planning; planning for steps following operation, including for property damage and civilian casualties

- ## 5. MITIGATION – CRU (TF81 APU) PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Steps taken to mitigate adverse reaction to operation, including significant involvement by Afghan forces and public information

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| TF81   | OP RAHBARI  | OBJ BURNHAM    |
|--|---|----------------|
| LEVEL 2  | DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)                      | 7 DAY APPROVAL |
| NIGHT RAID CRITERIA  |   |                |
| 1) ANSF should be included in all night raids. When this is not feasible, the CONOP or storyboard must highlight their absence, and provide justification for unilateral action. | ANSF personnel will be participating in this task.        |                |
| 2) A representative from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (e.g. ANA, ANP, NDS) should be notified prior to commencement of the operation.                   | MOI has approved the use of CRU                           |                |
| 3) ANSF should be the first force to make contact – they should be the first force seen and the first voices heard by the occupants of any compound entered.                     | ANSF will participate in the prosecution of OBJ BURNHAM . |                |

**PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

Listing of remaining classified Night Raid Directive criteria and explanation as to how operation will be in compliance with them

# PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Risk assessment. The following is a summary of this document taken from a U.S Department of Defence report '*Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*'.

## **Level 0 (Low Risk)**

-Day-time deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive 'soft-knock' and 'hard knock'

-Political consequences offer minimum potential of prejudicial IO, media or political impact.

## **Level 1 (Medium Risk)**

-Operations involving entry into houses or compounds at night to include deliberate pre-planned forced entry required (progressive 'soft knock' and 'hard knock'

-May have minor to moderate unfavorable regional media impact, detrimental IO and/or undesirable political consequences, manageable at the regional level.

## **Level 2 (High risk)**

-pre-planned kinetic operations within 1km of border with Pakistan or Iran


-SOF conducting deliberate operations with company size force or greater within 1km border with Pakistan, or 10km of border with Iran

-Arrest, apprehension, or detainment of any current or prominent former Afghan Government appointed official

-Potential for collateral damage, unfavorable media impact, severely detrimental IO, and/or undesirable political consequences at the national level.

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**TF81**      **OP RAHBARI**      **OBJ BURNHAM**  
**DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)**      **7 DAY APPROVAL**  
**LEVEL 2**

**INTEL SUMMARY SHEET****FUNCTION:**

Abdul KALTA is a TB Sub Commander under PSR(Sen)1

**SIGNIFICANCE:**

Abdul KALTA is a TB Sub Commander who leads attacks on CF and is involved in TB insurgent activity in Bamyan Province and Bamyan Area of Influence.

**EXPECTATION:**

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

**Explanation of wider military effects of  
Kalta's removal**

**RISK:**

Abdul KALTA has no known links to political or media organizations. Decisive IO needs to be conducted and explained to village elders in the NE Bamyan and SW Baghlan to thwart negative IO messages from INS.

**INTEL GAIN/LOSS:**

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

**Explanation of the type of knowledge Kalta had and relative impact of  
not obtaining this information if he is killed**

**THREAT STATEMENT:**

Abdul KALTA is assessed to have small arms and possibly IED's. He is likely to command 15-20 TB fighters in his village; at this time it is not known how many MAM's are inside his compound, the chance of SA attack is assessed as MEDIUM during the period of darkness and HIGH during daylight hours. HUMINT reports indicate that the Tirigan Village also operates a night guard force conducting armed roving patrols.

**ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE:**

24 total reports: all from Humint, from 11 separate sources, 11 which are graded C3 and above.

| NO | INTEL TYPE | SOURCE REF | GRAD E | DATE OF REPORT | DETAIL  | FLAG |
|----|------------|------------|--------|----------------|---|------|
| 1  | HUMINT     | 12         | B3     | 10 AUG 10      | ABDUL KALTA IMPLICATED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010                               | A    |
| 2  | HUMINT     | 8          | C3     | 9 AUG 10       | ABDUL KALTA LED THE PART ATTACK ON 03 AUGUST 2010 NEAR KARIMAK VILLAGE                                    | B    |
| 3  | HUMINT     | 2          | C3     | 8 AUG 10       | ABDUL KALTA NAMED AS ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010 | C    |
| 4  | HUMINT     | 8          | C3     | 5 AUG 10       | ABDUL KALTA (COMMANDER ABDULLAH QALTA) PLANNED AND LED THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010  | D    |
| 5  | HUMINT     | 3          | B2     | 4 AUG 10       | ABDUL KALTA (COMMANDER ABDULLAH) AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010 | E    |
| 6  | HUMINT     | 8          | C3     | 3 AUG 10       | ABDUL KALTA (COMMANDER ABDULLAH QALTA) PLANS THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010            | F    |

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TF81  
LEVEL 2

OP RAHBARI

DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

OBJ BURNHAM

7 DAY APPROVAL

## INTEL SUMMARY SHEET

FUNCTION: Maulawi NEMATULLAH is a TB Sub Commander under Mullah Abdul Hakim 1.2.7 - Tala Wa Barfak District, Baghlan. Suspected that he directs and conducts attacks in Bamyan AO, AI.

### SIGNIFICANCE:

Maulawi NEMATULLAH is a TB Sub Commander who leads attacks on CF and is involved in TB insurgent activity in Bamyan Province and Bamyan Area of Influence.

EXPECTATION:  
PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

**Explanation of wider military effects of Nematullah's removal**

### RISK:

Maulawi NEMATULLAH has no known links to political or media organizations. Decisive IO needs to be conducted and explained to village elders in the NE Bamyan and SW Baghlan to thwart negative IO messages from INS.

INTEL GAIN/LOSS:  
PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

**Explanation of the type of knowledge Kalta had and relative impact of not obtaining this information if he is killed**

### THREAT STATEMENT:

Maulawi NEMATULLAH is assessed to have small arms and possibly IED's. He is likely to command 15-20 TB fighters; at this time it is not known how many MAM's are inside his compound, the chance of SA attack is assessed as HIGH by day and MEDIUM by night. HUMINT reports indicate that the Trigan Village also operates a night guard force conducting armed roving patrols.

### ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE:

44 total reports: all from Humint, from 23 separate sources, 18 which are graded C3 and above. J2 Assessment: The balance of reliable HUMINT, within which multiple sources corroborate information, indicates that this intel is reliable and forms an accurate portrayal of the target's activities, links and intent.

| NO | INTEL TYPE | SOURCE REF | GRADE | DATE OF REPORT | DETAIL  | FLAG |
|----|------------|------------|-------|----------------|---|------|
| 1  | HUMINT     | 23         | C4    | 10AUG10        | MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IMPLICATED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010                | A    |
| 2  | HUMINT     | 12         | C3    | 9AUG10         | MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IMPLICATED WITH THE ON THE NZPRT CONVOY ON 03 AUGUST 2010 NEAR KARIMAK VILLAGE | B    |
| 3  | HUMINT     | 5          | C3    | 8AUG10         | MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010               | C    |
| 4  | HUMINT     | 23         | C4    | 10AUG10        | MAULAWI NEMATULLAH IMPLICATED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010                | D    |
| 5  | HUMINT     | 20         | B2    | 4AUG10         | MAULAWI NEMATULLAH AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON NZPRT PATROL, KARIMAK 3 AUGUST 2010       | E    |

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**DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)**  
**LEVEL 2**

7 DAY APPROVAL



|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| MOE                       | SOFT KNOCK (GRADUATED RESPONSE AS REQUIRED)  |
| LEGAD CONCURRENCE         | CONCUR – 15 Aug 10                           |
| RC CONCURRENCE            | CONCUR – 16 AUG                              |
| ROE FOR ISAF FORCES       | PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3                    |
| AFGHAN LAW FOR AFG FORCES | HIGH PROSECUTOR, APPROVED WARRANT FOR ARREST |
| POL ON COI's (HRS / TYPE) | 24hrs  |
| PID (FAM / W / C)         | 4 x MAMS @ coi 3                             |
|                           | Nii  |
|                           | Nii  |

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TF81  
LEVEL

OP RAHBARI  
DELIBERATE DETENTION OP

OBJ BURNHAM  
7 DAY APPROVAL

**Who:** TF81  
**What:** DDO  
**Where:** TALAWE BERFAK DISTRICT, BAGHILAN PROVINCE  
(A1 - 42SVD2303691463, A2 - 42SVD2307591473, A3 - 42SVD2309291151)  
**When:** ON TRIGGER. (POD 21 - 22 AUG 10)  
**Why:** DISRUPT INS NETWORK ELEMENTS PLANNING ATTACKS ON ANSF / COALITION FORCES AND LOCAL POPULATION AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF GIRoA.


**INTENT:** DISRUPT INS NETWORKS AND LEADERSHIP, DETAIN POI, PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST ANSF / COALITION FORCES AND LOCAL POPULATION AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF GIRoA. WHILST ENABLING MOI TO SERVE ARREST WARRANT AND ENFORCE GIRoA LAW.

**METHOD:** HUMINT TRIGGER, PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3, HAF INFIL BY NIGHT OF ASSAULT GP, C2 AND OVER WATCH POSITIONS. ISOLATE THE COI PRIOR TO ASSAULT FORCE CLEARING COI AND DETAINING POI. RAPID TSE WILL BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO BACKLOADING DETAINED POI AND MOVING ONTO SUBSEQUENT OBJ. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR PROSECUTION OF SUBSEQUENT OBJ REMAINS THE SAME AS PREVIOUS OBJ. EXFIL WILL BE BY HFO.

**ENDSTATE:** OBJ BURNHAM DETAINED, TSE COMPLETE, TU RECOVERED TO CW AND <sup>PSR(S)1, F</sup> HQ, [C] INTACT AND POSTURED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

**SCHEME OF MANOEUVRE:**  
PRELIMS: CONFIRM POI IN B  
PHASE 1: MOVE TO OBJ A1  
PHASE 2: DETAIN POI AT A1  
PHASE 3: DETAIN POI AT A2  
PHASE 4: TSE AND BSHO  
PHASE 5: RTU KABUL

**SUMMARY OF EXECUTION:** ON RECEIVING CONFIRMATORY INTEL, THE TU WILL STAGE FROM CW AND DEPLOY TO THE TARGET AREA IN ORDER TO CONTAIN AND ISOLATE COI AND CLEAR IOT DETAIN POI. COI WILL BE SEARCHED AND ITEMS OF INTEREST EXPLOITED. MAMS WILL BE DETAINED BY CRU TRANSPORTED TO MOH HOLDING FACILITIES FOR DETENTION PROCESSING. TU WILL CONDUCT BSHO PRIOR TO EXFIL TO KABUL.





NATIONAL SECURITY

LEVEL 2

**OP RAHBARI  
DEI IBERBATE DETENTION OBE**

**OBJ BURNHAM  
DAY APPROVAL**

## SOM / ACTION ON TARGET



## INSERTION:

Insertion will be conducted from CW by Heli with simultaneous insertion of HAF and Overwatch posms. HLZ will be secured by blocking force who will orientate N down the valley. **PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** while ISR and AC-130 will be over target.

## ACTION ON TARGET:

Aslt Force will move by foot to TIGARAN 1 and TIGARAN 2. POI 1 will be detained and exploitation conducted. Aslt Force will then move to TIGARAN 3, repeating process. Throughout operation overwatch position will provide cover and overwatch as required. Detainees will be processed by CRU and CO exploited. Aslt force will wdr back to HLZ where blocking force is providing security.


EXEL

HAF exfil will occur sequentially from HLZ with overwatch providing cover throughout, before being withdrawn themselves. AWT will remain on station with ISR to provide over watch throughout exfil to KABUL. All detained Bravos will be processed by MOI on return to KABUL.

## LOCATION(S):

A1 - 42SVD2303691463, A2 - 42SVD2307591473,  
A3 - 42SVD2200201151

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3



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OP RAHBARI

LEVEL 2



OBJ BURNHAM  
7 DAY APPROVAL  
DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

Medical Treatment:

**Level 1:** Buddy aid and 3x Adv Medics at CCP.  
TF 81 allocated primary medic to assign CCP, direct CASEVAC/MEDEVAC related duties and oversees triage.

**Level 2:** MEDEVAC platform stabilization en route and MASCAL contingency.

**Level 3:** Resuscitative /stabilisation & Surgical Capability at ISAF Role 2 / 3 (BAF Role 3 / KAIA Role 3 / PEK Role 2 ).

**Level 3:** BAF R3

Evacuation:

**Primary:** MEDEVAC (AIR ) to BAF R3.

**Alternate:** MEDEVAC (AIR ) to KAIA R3.

**Secondary Alternate:** MEDEVAC (AIR ) to PEK R2.

\* Determined by RC-E MEDEVAC (based on injury/conditions/asset availability etc.)

COMMS PLAN:  
PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

BAF R3

PRI

OBJ

260 KM

113 MINS(AIR)

KAIA R3

ALT

OBJ

260 KM

113 MINS (AIR)

PEK R2

SEC ALT

OBJ

276 KM

118 MINS (AIR)

BAM R1

STAB

POST

PRI

ALT


SEC ALT

OBJ

50 KM

30 MINS (AIR)

RETURN



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**LEVEL 2                    KARZAI'S 12**

| CONDITION   | STATUS   | COMMENT |
|---|--|---------|
| 1) Gain COMISAF approval before arrest, apprehension, or detainment of a current or former government appointed official                  | Green: Not a government official<br>Red: Pending COMISAF Approval for govt official; or CG approval for District official  |         |
| 2) Conduct coordination with local government officials and tribal leaders when conducting searches                                       | Green: Coordination conducted with village / District / Province leadership<br>Red: Coordination not conducted (any co-ordination likely to lead to compromise)        |         |
| 3) Ensure the return of materials / documents taken during searches, unless the owner is detained and the property becomes evidence       | Green: Material not required for exploitation will be returned<br>Red: All material will be retained until further disposition   |         |
| 4) Ensure personnel receive training on local customs and courtesies prior to conducting authorized searches                              | Green: All soldiers on mission trained<br>Red: Deficiency / soldiers not trained   |         |
| 5) Ensure soldiers conducting searches ask for doors to be Opened by occupants rather than soldiers forcing entry                         | Green: Leaders / ANSF/ GOA will ask occupants to Open doors (Soft Knock)<br>Red: Will not ask to Open doors; a hard-knock is required                                  |         |
| 6) Avoid the cuffing or binding of hands, unless required for security  | Green: Target will not be bound unless a threat to CF<br>Red: All targets will be bound  |         |
| 7) During low risk Operations, use a local person to enter the home or business of the person to be searched to explain what is happening | Green: Locals / ANSF / GOA will enter all buildings first (dependant on threat assessment)<br>Red: CF will enter first (dependant on threat assessment)                |         |
| 8) Conduct of night searches  | Green: No night search (dependant on target threat assessment)<br>Red: Night Search (dependant on target threat assessment)  |         |
| 9) Ensure there is an infusion of reconstruction funds to areas where local people were detained and subsequently released                | Green: Planned CMO follow-up and/or CERP Funds will be utilized in area<br>Red: No planned CMO / CERP follow-through will be spent in area ( Dependent on BSO post Op) |         |
| 10) Sustain the use of interpreters for direct interpretation while conducting raid or detaining GOA personnel                            | Green: Interpreters will be used for entire mission<br>Red: No interpreters  |         |
| 11) Deliberate Capture or Offensive Operation   | Green: Not a deliberate Capture or Offensive Operation<br>Red: Is a deliberate Capture or Offensive Operation  |         |
| 12) Operating within 10km of the IRAN or PAKISTAN border.   | Green: Operating more than 10km from the IRAN or PAKISTAN Border.<br>Red: Operating within 10km of the IRAN or PAKISTAN BORDER (COM SOF Approval Req)                  |         |




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## TASK ORG



PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

| UNIT           | LOCAL                    |  | REGIONAL            |         |
|----------------|--------------------------|--|---------------------|---------|
|                | CRU                      |  |                     | , GDPSU |
| TF81           | TF 81 TOC, CW            |  | COM ISAF SOF        |         |
| MOI PROSECUTOR | CONFIRMED<br>PRIOR TO OP |  | PSR(sem)1, PSR(IC)4 |         |

### ANSF INVOLVEMENT

| TOTAL NUMBER OF ANSF: | X | (CRU), MOI |
|-----------------------|---|------------|
| Planning              | H | M L        |
| Preparation           | H | M L        |
| Execution             | H | M L        |
| Post Op Assessment    | H | M L        |

| EXTERNAL SUPPORT | ORG                          | NTM    | DIS | RESPONSE TIME |
|------------------|------------------------------|--------|-----|---------------|
|                  |                              |        |     | PSR(S)1       |
| QRF              | BAF QRF and AWFT (2 x AH-64) |        |     |               |
| MEDEVAC          |                              | AME    |     |               |
| ISR              |                              | RC-E   |     |               |
| FIRE             |                              | DIRECT |     |               |

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$PSR(S)^1$ ,  $PSR(S)^2$ ,  $PSR(S)^3$



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## EXPOITATION

| DETENTION AUTHORITY   | TSE/SSE  |
|---|--|
| CRU has detention authority (MOI Warrant for Arrest)  | Recovered from the site and taken to MOI for exploitation      |
| DETENTION   | DOC/MED/COMM EXPLOITATION                                      |
| ABDUL KALTA (OBJ BURNHAM) and NEMATULLAH (OBJ NOVA / PSR(S)1 ) are to be detained by CRU and handed to MOI for detention and prosecution  | Exploitation by MOI investigators                              |
| SEARCH MITIGATION   | EXPLOSIVES   |
| Women and minors will be kept in a separate area  | Recovered from the site and forwarded to CEXC for exploitation |
| FURTHER PROCESSING AND TQ   | FORENSICS  |
| Detainees will be questioned on site for tactically valuable information by CRU personnel. Dependent on tactical situation and on the advice of APU all likely INS will be biometrically screened / enrolled. | Recovered from the site and then taken to MOI                  |
| RELEASING OF INNOCENTS  | TRANSFER OF MATERIAL   |
| Civilians will not be detained  | Recovered from the site and taken to MOI                       |
| TRANSFER OF DETAINEES   | EVIDENCE FOR PROSECUTION                                       |
| All detainees will be recovered directly to MOI   | TF81 to collate OP int/evidence in DARI REL GIROA for MOI      |

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## IO EXPLOITATION

| IO OBJECTIVE   | RELEASABLE INFORMATION  |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Degrade INS C2.</li><li>Inform LNs of ISAF successes.</li><li>Discourage local population from supporting or joining INS groups.</li></ul>   | <p><u>IO OPPORTUNITIES:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>If NEMATULLAH (OBJ NOVA / <b>PSR(S)1</b>) and ABDUL KALTA (OBJ BURNHAM) are captured and prosecuted by GIROA, it would significantly reinforce the authority and capability of GIROA and its security forces.</li></ul>   |
| <p><u>IO THEMES &amp; MESSAGES</u></p> <p><u>SUPPORTED ISAF/RC PRIORITIES:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Protect the Population from AAF</li><li>Disrupt the Taliban Network across all Lines of Operation</li><li>Secure Freedom of Movement on Major RC-N Highways</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Name of individual only releasable following UNCLAS reflections, in which case the following should be released:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Position the individual holds within the INS organisation.</li></ul></li><li>Summary of the illegal activities the individual has been involved in (Facilitation, IEDs, Conventional Attacks).</li><li>Details of any other significant INS the individual has close association with.</li><li>Details of any weapons and munitions discovered on target. Images containing relevant content in support of narrative.</li></ul> |
| <p><u>IO TASKS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>PA release co-ordinated through MOI.</li><li>IO partnership tasks through ISAF SOF IO.</li></ul>  |   |

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OP RAHBARI

DELIBERATE DETENTION OPERATION (DDO)

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OBJ BURNHAM  
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| Overall Risk to Mission   |      | HIGH   | LOW   | Risk of CIVCAS?                                  | YES   |
|---|------|--|---|--|---|
| Overall Risk to Force   |      | HIGH   | LOW   | Collateral Damage Estimate Completed?            | NO  |
| Overall Risk  |      |  |   | Key Communicators in AO                          | Method Of Influence                                   |
| HIGH – Requires detailed Consequence Management planning and deconfliction with ISAF SOF HQ & BSO.  |      | ANP<br>ANA<br>OCC-R<br>OCC-P                       | NA<br>NA<br>BAGHLAN<br>MAZAR-e SHARIFF              | PSR(IC)4<br>PSR(IC)4                             | —   |
| MEDIUM – Requires detailed Consequence Management planning at the TF level.   |      | District<br>Tribal<br>Civilian<br>NGO<br>Religious | NA<br>Village elder<br>NIL<br>NIL<br>Village mullah | NA<br>Through KLE.<br>NIL<br>NIL<br>Through KLE. |   |
| LOW – Reactive Consequence Management as required.  |      | Other  | NIL   |  |   |
| Risk Analysis   |      |  |   | Mitigation Strategies                            |   |
| Date of Last CIVCAS Incident or allegation in AO  |      | NIL  | Radio Message Prepared?                             | YES  | BROADCAST LOCATION BAMYAN PRT                         |
| Risk of adverse LN response to Op?  | HIGH | HIGH   |   |  |   |
| Risk of adverse Media Coverage?   | LOW  | LOW  | Media Release Prepared?                             | YES  | POSTER PREPARED TO BE LEFT ON TARGET AREA             |
| BSO pre-briefed on Op?  | YES  | YES  |   |  |   |
| Does ISAF hold the ground?  | NO   | NO   | Combat Camera?                                      | YES  | ORGANIC   |
| Enemy presence in the AO?   | YES  | YES  |   |  |   |
| Risk of INS propaganda?   | MED  | MED  | Media Monitoring?                                   | YES  | THROUGH ISAF SOF IO                                   |
| Is there local acceptance of ISAF forces?   | NO   | NO   |   |  |   |
| Is there an effective ANSF presence?  | NO   | NO   | Payments Authorized?                                | YES  | THROUGH MOI   |
| Is there effective District political leadership?   | NO   | NO   |   |  |   |
| Is there effective Provincial political leadership?   | NO   | UNKNOWN  | Investigation Team Standby?                         | YES  | IJC INVESTIGATION TEAM AVAILABLE THROUGH ISAF SOF LNO |
| Mitigation Tasks  |      |  |   |  |   |
| Media Release through BSO. A BSHO will occur PSR(S)1<br>LN engagement. A response will then be co-ordinated between NZPRT and BSO.  |      |  |   |  |   |
| The required records will be completed in both English and Dari or Pashto. Photographic evidence will support this documentation  |      |  |   |  |   |
| Should it prove tactically feasible for both LN's and GF, local leaders will be identified and a brief APU lead Shura will be conducted to mitigate perceived negative aspects of the operation |      |  |   |  |   |

dated 081916Z Apr 10

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~~NATO//ISAF-SECRET~~

**NATO/ISAF SECRET**

TF81

OP RAHBARI

LEVEL 2

OBJ BURNHAM


7 DAY APPROVAL

## Deconfliction Data

|                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| TF                                   | TF81   |
| Op Name Loc                          | OP RAHBARI<br>OBJ BURNHAM                      |
| Ops Box                              | 5000M RADIUS AROUND<br>GRID 42S VD 23015 91304 |
| Start                                | 212000D+ AUG 10                                |
| End                                  | 220800D+ AUG 10                                |
| Point of Contact<br>and contact info | TF81 LNO:<br>ISAF VOIP <b>PSR(S1)</b>          |

**DECONFLCTION SLIDE**

Ref:PSR(S)1



Complete  
Ongoing  
Incomplete  
Not done



Battlespace Owner  
RC-N  
IJC

**Remarks/Restrictions:**  
Handover of Ops box on completion of Operation and a results brief to BSO. ANSF led and MOI paperwork completed by APU.  
Due to isolation of tgt handover will be conducted with BSO between TOCs.

**NATO/ISAF SECRET**